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questions or the underlying equities. Inasmuch as the present approach appears unsatisfactory, two alternatives are submitted: (1) the
legislature "affirm" Logan and, realizing its implications, extend the
time period within which to commence the special proceeding; or,
(2) the Court seize upon the earliest opportunity to distinguish Logan
on its facts.
NEw YORK STATE CONSTITUTION

Art. 6, § 19(f): Status of litigation in supreme court affected by proceedings in New York City Civil Court even though civil court transferred the action because it lacked jurisdiction.
The mandatory transfer provision contained in article 6, section
19(f) of the state constitution 6' is self-executing; 6 2 hence, the burden
of effectuating the intent behind that section falls upon the judiciary.
And, although the language of the section is explicit, delicate questions of interpretation surround its implementation. 3 For example,
in Kemper v. TransamericaInsurance Co.,64 the New York City Civil
Court was confronted with the problem of determining the effect, if
any, of previous proceedings in the civil court upon the status of the
litigation in the supreme court.
In Kemper, the defendant, already in default, moved in the New
York City Civil Court to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
plaintiff's claim exceeded the court's monetary jurisdiction. Recognizing the validity of the defendant's assertion, 65 the court, nevertheless,
denied the motion; instead, it directed, sua sponte, that the action
be transferred to the supreme court.
Concerning the stage at which the action should reach the supreme court, the civil court held that despite the absence of legislative
guidance the status of the case should be no different than if it had
61N.Y. CoNsr. art. 6, § 19(0 (1962) provides that the court "shall transfer to the
supreme court . . . any action . . . over which the said courts for the city of New York
have no jurisdiction." (Emphasis added.)
62 Cf. Frankel Assoc., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 45 Misc. 2d 607, 257 N.Y.S.2d
555 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
63 Many of the problems of construction arise because the CPLR was drafted prior
to the judiciary article of the state constitution, and, in several aspects, they are inconsistent. 7B MCKINEY'S CPLR 325, commentary 622-23 (1963). Nevertheless, the
constitutional provisions take precedence over the CPLR. Garland v. Raunheim, 29 App.

Div. 2d 383, 288 N.Y.S.2d 417 (Ist Dep't 1968).
64 61 Misc. 2d 7, 304 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
65 Although the complaint in Kemper stated several causes of action, the court held
that it alleged one primary right of the plaintiff and one wrong by the defendant.
Therefore, the court viewed the complaint as stating one cause of action which exceeded its jurisdiction.
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been transferred by motion in the supreme court. 66 In the latter instance, CPLR 326(b) governs, and subsequent proceedings are had in
the supreme court "as if the action had been originally commenced
there and no process, provisional remedy or other proceedings taken
in the court from which the action was removed [is] invalid as the
result of removal." Hence, the civil court reasoned that if a similar
approach were not adopted when an identical motion was made before
it, a lesser measure of relief would be provided and the constitution67
ally directed procedure might rarely be utilized.
The New York City Civil Court cannot exercise jurisdiction
over a cause of action for money damages exceeding $10,000.68 Prior
to the constitutional amendment, unless an application for a transfer
was promptly made to the court with the requisite monetary jurisdiction,6 9 the practice was for the court in which the action was
brought to dismiss the complaint.70 However, Kemper illustrates that
the state constitution now gives the civil court the power to transfer
causes of action seeking damages in excess of its jurisdiction to the
supreme court rather than dismiss the complaint. Inasmuch as the
transfer can be effectuated sua sponte by the civil court, 71 the practi-

tioner is encouraged not to ignore a summons and complaint even
though that court patently lacks jurisdiction. 72 For, a defendant who
fails to serve his responsive pleadings may have no alternative but to
submit to the bothersome procedure of moving to open his default
in the supreme court.
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CPLR 203(e): Plaintiff permitted to add second cause of action arising
out of the same occurrence even though statute of limitations had run.
CPLR 203(e) declares that claims interposed by an amended
pleading relate back to the date of the original pleading unless the
825(a) & (b).
67 61 Misc. 2d at 10, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
66 CPLR

68 N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 15 (1962).

See Taylor v. Goodrich, 284 App. Div. 928, 134 N.YS.2d 202 (4th Dep't 1954).
See Vigil v. Cayuga Constr. Corp., 185 Misc. 676, 54 N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.),
aff'd, 185 Misc. 680, 55 N.YS.2d 909 (App. T. 1st Dep't), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 934, 58
N.Y.S.2d 343 (1st Dep't 1945).
71 Cf. Keegan v. Queens County Jockey Club, 34 Misc. 2d 958, 228 N.YS.2d 729
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962). On the other hand, CPLR 325 requires a motion by the
plaintiff. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 325, commentary 623 (1963).
72 Authority that the action must be commenced in a court that had jurisdiction
at least over the kind of action brought by the plaintiff is no longer controlling. 7B
McKINNEY'S CPLR 325, commentary 623 (1963). Clearly, therefore, the rationale in
Kemper is not limited to claims in excess of the monetary jurisdiction of the city court.
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